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Abstract—Terrorist attacks all across the world have become
a major source of concern for almost all national governments.
The United States Department of State’s Bureau of Counter-
Terrorism, maintains a list of 66 terrorist organizations spanning
the entire world. Actively monitoring a large number of orga-
nizations and their members, require considerable amounts of
resources on the part of law enforcement agencies. Oftentimes,
the law enforcement agencies do not have adequate resources to
monitor these organizations and their members effectively. On
multiple incidences of terrorist attacks in recent times across
Europe, it has been observed that the perpetrators of the attack
were in the suspect databases of the law enforcement authorities,
but weren’t under active surveillance at the time of the attack,
due to resource limitations on the part of the authorities. As
the suspect databases in various countries are very large, and
it takes significant amount of technical and human resources to
monitor a suspect in the database, monitoring all the suspects
in the database may be an impossible task. In this paper, we
propose a novel terror network monitoring approach that will
significantly reduce the resource requirement of law enforcement
authorities, but still provide the capability of uniquely identifying
a suspect in case the suspect becomes active in planning a terrorist
attack. The approach relies on the assumption that, when an
individual becomes active in planning a terrorist attack, his/her
friends/associates will have some inkling of the individuals plan.
Accordingly, even if the individual is not under active surveillance
by the authorities, but the individual’s friends/associates are,
then the individual planning the attack can be uniquely identified.
We apply our techniques on various real-world terror network
datasets and show the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Identifying Codes, Discriminating Codes, Ter-
rorist Networks, Monitoring
I. INTRODUCTION
Global terrorism is a major source of concern for na-
tional governments and law enforcement authorities all across
the world, particularly in Europe and Asia. The Bureau of
Counter-Terrorism, a division of the United States Department
of State, maintains a list of 66 active terrorist organizations
based all over the world. Actively monitoring such organiza-
tional networks is a considerable challenge on the part of the
governments and law enforcement agencies in the sense that,
significant amount of resources must be utilized to monitor
these networks. Oftentimes, the law enforcement agencies do
not have sufficient resources to monitor these organizations
and their members effectively. It has been reported that the
French Centre for the Analysis of Terrorism has determined
that it takes as many as 20 agents per suspect to conduct 24-
hour surveillance. On multiple incidences of terrorist attacks
in recent times across Europe, it has been observed that
the perpetrators of the attack were in the suspect databases
of the law enforcement authorities, but weren’t under active
surveillance at the time of the attack due to resource limitations
on the part of the authorities.
According to reports, the two suspects in the attack against
French police on April 20, 2017, on the Champs-Elysees, were
known to French anti-terrorism authorities. The November
2015 attacks in Paris that claimed a total of 130 lives,
involved a small network of ISIS-linked terrorists in France
and Belgium. Of the 10 individuals involved, several were
known to authorities. When 12 people were killed at the
Paris headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine, all
three of the terrorists had been under close watch. Cherif
Kouachi, Said Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly were under
police surveillance for three years, but eventually dropped in
the summer of 2014 only months before the deadly January
2015 attack [1].
As the suspect databases in various countries are very
large, and it takes significant amount of technical and human
resources to monitor a suspect in the database, monitoring
all the suspects in the database may be an impossible task.
The news organization Politico, [2] reported in October 2016
that the French authorities were monitoring around 15,000
individuals who were suspected of being radical Islamists.
The Politico report was based on an earlier publication in
the French journal, La Journal du Dimanche. The ABC news
affiliated TV station WJLA in Washington D.C., reported
in 2017 that, the list has tripled over the last two years
[3]. The database is managed by Frances Counter-Terrorism
Coordination Unit. Obviously, the resources and manpower
needed to keep all the terror suspects under surveillance is
enormous and often are way beyond the available resources
of any local law enforcement authority.
In this paper, we propose a novel Terrorist Network Mon-
itoring (TNM) approach that will significantly reduce the
resource requirement of law enforcement authorities, but still
provide the capability of uniquely identifying a suspect in
case the suspect becomes active in planning a terrorist attack.
The approach relies on the assumption that, when an indi-
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vidual becomes active in planning a terrorist attack, his/her
friends/associates will have some inkling of the individu-
als plan. Accordingly, even if the individual is not under
active surveillance by the authorities, but the individual’s
friends/associates are, then the individual planning the attack
can be uniquely identified. The mathematical foundation of our
approach relies on Identifying Code and its variation known
as Discriminating Code and is described in detail in Section
III. Our Identifying Code based approach ensures that the
resource requirement of the law enforcement authorities will
be significantly reduced, without compromising the ability
of unique identification of a suspect in case he/she becomes
active in planning a terrorist attack.
We study terrorist networks from two perspectives. In the
first perspective, the nodes represent individuals and the edges
represent their relationships. In the second, we have two
different types of nodes, one representing individuals and
the other representing the organizations. The edges in this
version do not represent individual to individual relationships,
instead they represent the relationships between individuals
and organizations. Our approach utilizes Identifying Codes for
the study of the first type of networks, and Discriminating
Codes for the second type. We apply our techniques on six
real-world terror network datasets and show the effectiveness
of our approach. The networks for our analysis, were obtained
from the UCINET repository online [4]. In the following
paragraphs, we briefly discuss our datasets.
The first network on which we applied our technique is the
network of the individuals involved in the terror attack in Paris
in November 2015. This network, as shown in Fig. 3(a), had
10 nodes and 14 edges. Our analysis showed that, if 5 of the
10 individuals were monitored, the attackers most likely would
have been exposed.
We next analyze the Rizal Day bombings in 2000, where a
series of bombs exploded in Metro Manila, Philippines. Our
analysis technique requires that neighborhood of each node
of the network be unique. The reason for such a requirement
is explained in Section III. In this network, 16 individuals
were involved, but two sets of two individuals had identical
neighborhoods. In order to satisfy our analysis technique
requirement, that neighborhood of each node of the network
be unique, we combined nodes with identical neighborhoods
into a single super-node. After the combination, the network
has 14 nodes and 52 edges, and is shown in Fig. 3(b). Our
analysis showed that the attackers could have been exposed if
6 of the 14 individuals (nodes) were monitored.
The IS-Europe network (or the Zerkani Network), shown in
Fig. 4(a), forms the third network in our study. For the same
reason as in the Philippines network, a pair of nodes were
combined to form a super-node. After the combination, the
network had 39 nodes. We show that if 17 of the 39 nodes
were monitored, then the attackers would have been exposed.
The Madrid train bombings network of 2004, shown in Fig.
4(b), is the fourth network in our analysis. Out of the 54
individuals involved the bombings, if 17 were monitored, then
the attackers could have been identified.
The fifth network is the Noordin Mohammed Top network
[5]. The authors in [5] identified four individuals, Noordin Top,
Azhari Husin, Purnama Putra and Ahmad Ridho, as the key
individuals of the network. In our analysis, we view these four
individuals as layer 1 individuals, and the remaining as layer 2
individuals. As monitoring the key players (layer 1 individuals)
is often significantly more difficult than monitoring layer 2
individuals, we focus on monitoring the layer 1 individuals in
an indirect manner, by directly monitoring layer 2 individuals
who are interacting with the layer 1 individuals. To capture this
mechanism, we construct a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E),
where the nodes in V1 represent the individuals in layer 1 and
the nodes in V2 represent the individuals in layer 2. An edge
e ∈ E connects a node u ∈ V1 with a node v ∈ V2, if u
interacts with v. In this network |V1| = 4 and |V2| = 15, and
is shown in Fig. 5(a). Our analysis shows that, if 3 of the
15 layer 2 individuals were monitored, then all four layer 1
individuals could have been exposed.
The final network in our analysis is a network of terrorist
organizations and their members, based in East Turkestan. This
is a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), where V1 represents
the organizations and V2 represents the individuals. An edge
e ∈ E connects a node u ∈ V1 with a node v ∈ V2, if v is a
member of u. This network is shown in Fig. 5(b). We show
that if 15 out of 64 terrorists were monitored then the 20
terrorist organizations would have been uniquely monitored.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we review the literature related to terrorist net-
work analysis as well as Identifying Codes. Section III is an
overview of the mathematical concepts of Identifying Codes
and Discriminating Codes. The problem of monitoring TNM
is formally presented in Section IV. Section V provides the
solution technique to the terrorist monitoring problem. In
Section VI we present the results of our experiments on the
six real world terror networks described earlier. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the past few years, significant research on counter-
terrorism has been conducted through social network analysis.
In this section, we highlight a few key contributions that forms
the basis for this effort. The authors in [6], investigate the
suitability of social network analysis for studying terrorist
networks. Krebs in [7], mapped the 9/11 terror network from
articles in leading newspapers. Carley in [8], explored the
potential of using social network analysis and multi-agent
modeling for the purpose of destabilizing terrorist networks.
Julei in [9], studied the bipartite networks of terrorist organi-
zations in East Turkestan.
In an earlier effort, we introduced the concept of utilizing
Identifying Codes for monitoring terrorist networks in [10].
Our current effort expands on the results in [10] in multiple
directions. In our earlier effort, we analyzed individual to
individual networks to obtain the unique signature for each
individual (node) in the network. In [10], we did not con-
sider the scenario of multiple individuals becoming active
simultaneously. If multiple individuals (say, 2) become active
simultaneously, not only do we need unique signature for each
individual node, but also need unique signature for every pair
of nodes. We consider this scenario in our current effort.
Moreover, we consider individual to organization type of
networks, which was not considered in [10]. Formalism of
this scenario gives rise to computation of Discriminating Code
for a bipartite graph formed by organizations and individuals.
Discriminating Codes were not studied in [10]. Finally, in this
paper we present the results of our experimentation on a much
larger dataset than what was presented in [10].
In addition to counter-terrorism research through social
network analysis, the last few years have seen a significant
amount of research on Identifying Codes and its applications
in networks. Karpovsky et. al. [11] introduced the concept of
Identifying Codes in [11] and provided results for Identifying
Codes for graphs with specific topologies, such as binary cubes
and trees. Using Identifying Codes, Laifenfeld et. al. studied
joint monitoring and routing in wireless sensor networks in
[12]. Charon et. al. in [13], studied complexity issues related
to computation of minimum Identifying Codes for graphs and
showed that in several types of graphs, the problem is NP-
hard. Ray et. al. in [14] generalized the concept of Identifying
Codes, to incorporate robustness properties to deal with faults
in sensor networks.
A special case, where only a subset of nodes needs a unique
code, can be modeled with a bipartite graph, and this version
of Identifying Codes is called “Discriminating Codes” and was
studied in [15]. This special case is relevant for our study as,
our problem formulation of individual to organization network
requires us to find the unique signatures of all nodes of one
side of bi-partition of a bipartite graph, by selecting only a
subset of the nodes in the other side of bi-partition. This
formulation corresponds directly to “Discriminating Codes”.
III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF IDENTIFYING AND
DISCRIMINATING CODES
In this section, we formally define the mathematical notion
of Identifying and Discriminating Codes. Subsequently, we
present our novel approach which utilizes these notions to
uniquely monitor a given terror network.
Definition III.1. Given a graph G = (V,E), the subset V ′ ⊆
V , is defined as an Identifying Code Set (ICS) for the vertex
set V , if ∀v ∈ V,N [v]∩V ′ is unique, where, N [v] = v∪N(v)
and N(v) represents the set of nodes adjacent to v in G =
(V,E). The Minimum Identifying Code Set (MICS) problem
is to find the ICS of smallest cardinality.
The vertices of the set V ′ can be thought of as alphabets
of the code, and the string made up with the alphabets of
N [v] can be viewed as the unique “code” for the node v. This
is better explained with the help of the following example.
Consider a graph G = (V,E), as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
Identifying Code Set for G is V ′ = {v4, v6, v7, v8}. As shown
in Table I, in G = (V,E), ∀v ∈ V,N [v]∩V ′ is unique. Hence,
the node set V ′ = {v4, v6, v7, v8} is an ICS of G.
Fig. 1. Graph with Identifying Code Set {v4, v6, v7, v8}
Fig. 2. Bipartite Graph with Discriminating Code Set {b2, b4}
Definition III.2. Two nodes u, v ∈ V are said to be “twins”
if N [v] = N [u].
Observation: Identifying Code Set (ICS) of a graph G =
(V,E) does not exist, if any two nodes u, v ∈ V are “twins”.
TABLE I
N [v] ∩ V ′ RESULTS FOR ALL v ∈ V FOR THE GRAPH IN FIG. 1
N [v1] ∩ V ′ = {v7, v8} N [v2] ∩ V ′ = {v8}
N [v3] ∩ V ′ = {v4} N [v4] ∩ V ′ = {v4, v8}
N [v5] ∩ V ′ = {v6, v8} N [v6] ∩ V ′ = {v6, v7, v8}
N [v7] ∩ V ′ = {v6, v7} N [v8] ∩ V ′ = {v4, v6, v7, v8}
Definition III.3. Given a bipartite graph G = (V1∪V2, E), the
subset V ′2 ⊆ V2, is defined as a Discriminating Code Set (DCS)
for the vertex set V1, if ∀v ∈ V1, N(v) ∩ V ′2 is unique where,
N(v) ⊆ V2 represents the set of nodes adjacent to v ∈ V1.
The Minimum Discriminating Code Set (MDCS) problem is
to find the DCS of smallest cardinality.
Thus, the Discriminating Code problem is a restricted
version of the Identifying Code problem, where the graph
is bipartite. Simply stated, the monitoring problem in such a
scenario, is to obtain unique signatures for nodes in V1 using
a subset of the nodes in V2. We illustrate this with the help of
the an example, shown in Fig. 2. Here, V1 = {r1, r2, r3},
V2 = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5} and the DCS V ′2 = {b2, b4}, as
∀v ∈ V1, N(v) ∩ V ′2 is unique, as shown in Table II.
Observation: Discriminating Code Set (DCS) of a bipartite
graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) does not exist if any two nodes
u, v ∈ V1 are “twins”.
In Section I, we indicated that in some networks, such as
the Philippines and IS-Europe, we combined multiple nodes
into a single super-node. The reason for this combination is
TABLE II
N(v) ∩ V ′2 RESULTS FOR ALL v ∈ V1 FOR THE GRAPH IN FIG. 2
N(r1) ∩ V ′2 = {b2}
N(r2) ∩ V ′2 = {b2, b4}
N(r3) ∩ V ′2 = {b4}
the following. We noted that neither Identifying Code nor
Discriminating Code can be computed if the corresponding
graphs have “twins”. In the Philippine network, the nodes
6 and 7 as well as 14 and 15 are “twins”. In the IS-
Europe network, the nodes 33 and 35 are “twins”. By
combining the “twin” nodes into a super-node, we can ensure
computation of Identifying and/or Discriminating Code in
the modified network. However, as the modified network
does not have node 6 or 7 (it has a super-node (6, 7)),
if the individual corresponding to node 6 or 7 becomes
active, Identifying Code will not be able to distinguish
between these two individuals. If there is any indication
that the super-node (6, 7) is in the process of being active,
then further (lower level) analysis will be needed to find
out whether node 6 or node 7 is in the process of being active.
MICS and MDCS computation as a Graph
Coloring with Seepage (GCS) Problem:
The MICS and MDCS computation problem can be viewed
as a novel variation of the standard Graph Coloring problem.
We will refer to this version as the Graph Coloring with
Seepage (GCS) problem. In the standard graph coloring
problem, when a color is assigned (or injected) to a node,
only that node is colored. The goal of the standard graph
coloring problem to use as few distinct colors as possible
such that (i) every node receives a color, and (ii) no two
adjacent nodes of the graph have the same color. In the GCS
problem, when a color is assigned (or injected) to a node, not
only that node receives the color, the color also seeps into all
the adjoining nodes. As a node vi may be adjacent to two
other nodes vj and vk in the graph, if the color red is injected
to vj , not only will vj become red, but also vi will become
red as it is adjacent to vj . Now if the color blue is injected to
vk, not only will vk become red, but also, the color blue will
seep in to vi as it is adjacent vk. Since vi was ready colored
red (due to seepage from vj), after color seepage from vk,
its color will be a combination of red and blue, i.e., purple.
At this point all three nodes vi, vj and vk have a color and
all of them have distinct colors (red, blue and purple). The
goal of the GCS problem is to inject colors to as few nodes
as possible, such that (i) every node receives a color, and (ii)
no two nodes of the graph have the same color.
Suppose that the node set V ′ is an ICS of of a graph
G = (V,E) and |V ′| = p. In this case if p distinct colors
are injected to the nodes of V ′ (one distinct color to one
node of V ′ ), then as by the definition of ICS for all
v ∈ V if N [v] ∩ V ′ is unique, all nodes of G = (V,E)
will be colored and no two nodes will have the same color.
Accordingly, computation of the MICS problem is equivalent
to computation of the GCS problem.
Similar argument also holds for computation of the MDCS
problem. Assume that the node set V ′2 is a DCS of of a graph
G = (V1∪V2, E) and |V ′2 | = p. In this case if p distinct colors
are injected to the nodes of V ′2 (one distinct color to one node
of V ′2 ), then as by the definition of DCS for all v ∈ V1 if
N(v)∩V ′2 is unique, all nodes v ∈ V1 will be colored and no
two nodes will have the same color.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formalize the Terrorist Network Mon-
itoring problem using two different types of networks. In
the first type of network, the nodes represents individuals
(terrorists) and the edges represent the relationships between
the individuals (may be friends/associates). In the second type,
we have two different types of nodes - organizations and
individuals. The edges of this type represent the relationship
between the individuals and the organizations. In the following
two subsections, we elaborate on our study of these two
different types of networks.
A. Individual to Individual (I-to-I) Network
In this section, we formalize three different versions of the
monitoring problem on individual to individual networks.
Version 1: If the network is represented as a graph G =
(V,E), the goal of the first version is to monitor1 a subset
of nodes V ′ ⊆ V , so that every node v ∈ V can be
uniquely identified, in case the individual representing the node
v becomes active in planning an attack. This version assumes
that only one node becomes active at a time (i.e., simultaneous
activation of two or more nodes is not considered in this
version). Moreover, in this version, any node v ∈ V can be
monitored.
The goal of this version of the TMN problem is to monitor
the fewest number of terrorists (through surveillance) so that,
if any one terrorist becomes active (planning an attack) in
the network, then this individual can be uniquely identified.
As discussed in Section III, the goal of the GCS problem
is to inject colors to as few nodes as possible, so that (i)
every node receives a color, and (ii) no two nodes of the
graph have the same color. The GCS problem has direct
correspondence with the TNM problem, in the sense that,
the terrorists to be monitored in the TNM problem, may be
viewed as the nodes where colors have to be injected in the
GCS problem. As injecting colors into this set of nodes will
ensure that each node of the network will have a unique color,
monitoring the corresponding terrorists will provide us with a
unique signature of each node (terrorist) in the network. In
other words, unique signature of a terrorist will correspond to
the unique color associated with the corresponding node. As
further discussed in Section III, the GCS problem is equivalent
to the computation of the MICS problem. By transitivity, it is
clear that the TNM problem is equivalent to solving the MICS
problem of the corresponding terrorist network.
1A monitor in this context means surveillance of the individual
Version 2: This version is almost identical to Version 1,
except that in this version, simultaneous activation of at most
two nodes is allowed. In version 1, we required that each
node has its unique signature. The version 1 excludes the
possibility of more than one terrorist becoming active at
the same time. In this version, we relax this constraint and
consider the possibility of at most two terrorists becoming
active simultaneously. In this scenario, not only we require
that every terrorists has a unique signature (i.e., every node
has a unique color), but also every pair of terrorists (nodes)
has a unique signature (color). Thus, this version of the TNM
problem is equivalent to solving the MICS problem with this
additional constraint.
Version 3: The versions 1 and 2 assume that any node v ∈ V ,
may become active and can be monitored. In this version, only
a subset V1 ⊂ V needs to be monitored and monitors can
only be placed in the subset V2 = V − V1. In this case, we
can construct a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), where each
node in V1 is required to have a unique color. The goal of this
version of the problem is to inject colors at the fewest number
of nodes in V2, such that every node in V1 receives a unique
color. Thus, this version of the TNM problem is equivalent to
solving the MDCS problem, discussed in Section III.
B. Individual to Organization (I-to-O) Network
In this subsection, we study individual to organizational
networks. If the network is represented as a graph G =
(V1 ∪ V2, E), where V1 represents the organizations and V2
represents the individuals. There is an edge between a node
u ∈ V1 to a node v ∈ V2 if the individual represented by
v is a member of the organization represented by u. The
goal of this version is to uniquely identify an organization
(if the organization becomes active), by monitoring a subset
of individuals belonging to these organizations. Accordingly,
this version of the TNM problem is equivalent to solving the
MDCS problem.
V. PROBLEM SOLUTION
In this section, we provide solution techniques for three
versions of I-to-I networks and one version of I-to-O network,
using Integer Linear Programs (ILP). In the following, we
provide the ILP formulations for each of the versions.
A. I-to-I Network: Version 1
Instance: G = (V,E), an undirected graph.
Problem: Find the smallest subset V ′ ⊆ V , such that injection
of colors at these nodes, ensures that each node v ∈ V ,
receives a unique color (either atomic or composite) through
seepage.
We use the notation N [vi] to denote the closed neighborhood
of vi, for any vi ∈ V . Corresponding to each vi ∈ V , we use
an indicator variable xi,
xi =
{
1, if a color is injected at node vi,
0, otherwise
Objective Function: Minimize
∑
vi∈V xi
Coloring Constraint:
∑
vi∈N [vj ] xi ≥ 1, ∀vj ∈ V
Unique Coloring Constraint:∑
vi∈{N [vj ]
⊕
N [vk]} xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk,∈ V
N [vj ]
⊕
N [vk] denotes the Exclusive-OR of the node sets
N [vj ] and N [vk]. It may be noted that the objective function
ensures that the fewest number of nodes in V are assigned a
color. The Coloring Constraint ensures that every node in V
receives at least one color through seepage from the colors
injected at nodes in its closed neighborhood. A consequence
of the Coloring Constraint is that, a node in V may receive
more than one color through seepage from the colors injected
at its neighborhood. The Unique Coloring Constraint ensures
that, for every pair of nodes (vj , vk) in V , at least one node in
the node set N [vj ]
⊕
N [vk] ⊆ V is injected with a color. This
guarantees that vj and vk will not receive identical colors.
B. I-to-I Network: Version 2
In this subsection we present an Integer Linear Program for
determining the unique signatures for pairs of nodes. In this
version, not only individual nodes are required to have unique
signatures, but also every pair of nodes are also required
to have unique signatures. This additional requirement (with
respect to Version 1) necessitates that the ILP ensures that
(i) a single node and a node pair do not end up having a
identical signature, and (ii) two node pairs do not end up
having a identical signature. Accordingly, the ILP is required
to have four constraints: (i) coloring constraint (same as in
version 1), (ii) unique coloring 1-1 constraint (same as unique
coloring constraint in version 1), (iii) unique coloring 1-2
constraint (not present in version 1), and (iv) unique coloring
2-2 constraint (not present in version 1).
Instance: G = (V,E), an undirected graph.
Problem: Find the smallest subset V ′ ⊆ V , such that injection
of colors at these nodes, ensures that each node vi and each
node pair (vj , vk) ∈ V , receive a unique color (either atomic
or composite) through seepage.
We use the notation N [vi] to denote the closed neighborhood
of vi, for any vi ∈ V . Corresponding to each vi ∈ V , we use
an indicator variable xi,
xi =
{
1, if a color is injected at node vi,
0, otherwise
Objective Function: Minimize
∑
vi∈V xi
Coloring Constraint:
∑
vi∈N [vj ] xi ≥ 1, ∀vj ∈ V
Unique Coloring 1-1 Constraint:∑
vi∈{N [vj ]
⊕
N [vk]} xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk,∈ V
Unique Coloring 1-2 Constraint:∑
vi∈{N [vj ]
⊕
(N [vk]∪N [vl]}) xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk 6= vl,∈ V
(a) Paris Network (b) Philippines Network
Fig. 3. Terror networks involved in the 2015 Paris and 2000 Philippines attacks respectively
Unique Coloring 2-2 Constraint:∑
vi∈{(N [vj ]∪N [vk])
⊕
(N [vl]∪N [vm])} xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk 6= vl 6=
vm,∈ V
The role of coloring constraint and unique coloring 1-1 con-
straint in this version is identical to the role of the coloring
constraint and unique coloring constraint in version 1. These
constraints ensure that no two nodes in the graph will have
identical color. This version has two additional constraints.
Color assigned to a pair of nodes (vk, vl) is the union of the
colors assigned to nodes vk and vl. The Unique Coloring 1-2
Constraint ensures that, for every pair of (vj , (vk, vl)) in V , at
least one node in the node set N [vj ]
⊕
(N [vk] ∪N [vl]) ⊆ V
is injected with a color. This guarantees that vj and (vk, vl)
will not receive identical colors. In other words, this constraint
ensures that for all combinations of distinct nodes u, v, w ∈ V ,
the node u will not have identical color as the node pair (v, w).
The Unique Coloring 2-2 Constraint ensures that, for every
pair of ((vj , vk), (vl, vm)) in V , at least one node in the node
set (N [vj ] ∪N [vk])
⊕
(N [vl] ∪N [vm]) ⊆ V is injected with
a color. This guarantees that (vj , vk) and (vl, vm) will not
receive identical colors. In other words, this constraint ensures
that for all combinations of distinct nodes u, v, w, x ∈ V , the
node pair (u, v) will not have identical color as the node pair
(w, x).
C. I-to-I Network: Version 3
It may be recalled that in this version, only a subset V1 ⊂
V needs to be monitored and monitors can only be placed
in the subset V2 = V − V1. We construct a bipartite graph
G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), where each node in V1 is required to have
a unique color. The goal of this version of the problem is to
inject colors at the fewest number of nodes in V2, such that
every node in V1 receives a unique color.
Instance: G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), an undirected bipartite graph.
Problem: Find the smallest subset V ′2 ⊆ V2, such that injection
of colors at these nodes, ensures that ∀vi ∈ V1, receives a
unique color (either atomic or composite) through seepage.
We use the notation N(vi) to denote the neighborhood of vi,
for any vi ∈ V1 ∪ V2. Corresponding to each vi ∈ V2, we use
an indicator variable xi,
xi =
{
1, if a color is injected at node vi,
0, otherwise
Objective Function: Minimize
∑
vi∈V2 xi
Coloring Constraint:
∑
vi∈N(vj) xi ≥ 1, ∀vj ∈ V1
Unique Coloring Constraint:∑
vi∈{N(vj)
⊕
N(vk)} xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk,∈ V1
The notations and their explanations in this version is identical
to the earlier two versions. It can be easily verified that the
solution to the ILP finds the smallest subset V ′2 ⊆ V2, such
that injection of colors at these nodes, ensures that each node
vi ∈ V1, receives a unique color.
D. I-to-O Network
In both I-to-I network version 3 and I-to-O network, the
input is a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) and the goal is
to find the smallest subset V ′2 ⊆ V2 that assigns unique colors
to all the nodes of V1. Accordingly, the ILP formulation for
the solution to these two problems is identical and hence not
presented here.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our experimenta-
tions with six different datasets of real incidences. It may be
noted that if the network under study G = (V,E) is “twin-
free”, then the node set V is an Identifying Code Set for
the network, although it may not be the ICS of the smallest
cardinality. The four networks shown in Table III, have 10,
14, 39 and 54 nodes respectively. If monitors were placed
on every node (i.e., colors were injected at every node) of
the network, each node would have received a unique color
(signature). However, our solution shows that unique signature
(a) IS-Europe Network (b) Madrid Network
Fig. 4. Terrorist Networks involved in the 2015 Paris/Brussels attacks and 2004 Madrid train bombings respectively
(a) Noordin Top Key Player Network (b) Terrorist-Terrorist Organization Network [9]
Fig. 5. Terrorist networks involved in the 2004 Jakarta and East Turkestan attacks respectively
for each node can be obtained by injecting colors at only
5, 6, 17 and 17 nodes respectively. As deploying a higher
number of monitors (injecting colors) does not realize any
additional benefit, there is no reason to deploy a larger number
of monitors. The results presented in Table III show that
using our approach, resource requirement can be reduced by
50%, 57.14%, 56.41% and 68.52% respectively. As monitoring
(surveillance) of a terrorist suspect involves significant cost on
the part of law enforcement authorities, we expect that more
than 50% reduction of surveillance cost in every one of the
four networks, will be of great interest to the authorities.
In the following, we present the results in two subsections,
for the I-to-I and for the I-to-O networks, respectively.
A. I-to-I Networks
Version 1: In this version, we analyzed the Paris, Philippines,
IS-E and the Madrid networks. These networks are illustrated
in Figs. 3(a), 3(b), 4(a) and 4(b). For ease of understanding,
TABLE III
VERSION 1 RESULTS
Network Number of Colors Required % Reduction
Nodes for Unique in Resources
Monitoring
Paris Network 10 5 50
Philippines Network 14 6 57.14
IS-E Zerkani Network 39 17 56.41
Madrid Network 54 17 68.52
we have described the results of the Paris network in detail
and tabulated the results of the other networks in Table III.
TABLE IV
NODE COLOR ASSIGNMENT IN THE PARIS NETWORK
Node String Node String String Node String Node
1 B 6 ABCDE ABCDE 6 BC 4
2 ACDE 7 ACD ACD 7 BE 3
3 BE 8 ACE ACDE 2 C 5
4 BC 9 CE ACE 8 CD 10
5 C 10 CD B 1 CE 9
As indicated earlier, the Paris network consists of 10 in-
dividuals (nodes), who were involved in the attacks across
TABLE V
VERSION 2 RESULTS
Network Number of Number of Colors Number of Signatures Required for Unique Number of Unique Signatures Produced
Nodes Injected Identification for Single Nodes and Node Pairs After Injection of Colors at all Nodes
Paris 10 10 55 42
Philippines 14 14 105 37
Zerkani 39 39 780 692
Madrid 54 54 1485 1155
multiple locations in Paris, in November 2015. The Identifying
Code Set (ICS) for this network computed by the ILP given
in Section V, is V ′ = {2, 4, 6, 7, 8}. This implies that, by
injecting five colors A,B,C,D,E to nodes in V ′, all the
nodes in V receive a unique color (signature). This can be
verified with the help of Table IV. This table illustrates the
color string received by each node, and it is easy to verify
that these color strings are unique. The results for the other
three networks are presented in Table III.
Version 2: In this version, we present the results of our
approach when the simultaneous activation of two nodes is
allowed. The ICS obtained for the Paris network, in this
version, is V ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. In this network,
there are 10 nodes (individuals) and
(
10
2
)
= 45 possible
ordering of node pairs. Thus to have unique signatures for
single nodes and node pairs, there must be a total of 10 + 45
= 55 unique signatures. Our analysis for this network shows
that, even if colors are injected in all 10 nodes of the network,
it creates only 42 unique signatures. This happens because five
node pairs ((2, 6), (5, 6), (6, 7), (6, 9) and (6, 10)) receive the
same color. Moreover, there are four instances where two node
pairs ((1, 8), (4, 8)), ((2, 7), (2, 10)), ((3, 6), (6, 8)) and ((7,
8), (8, 10)) produce the same signature. These 13 non-unique
signatures are a result of the topology of the network. This
implies that, in the Paris network, further analysis is needed
to uniquely identify the node pairs that becomes active. The
results for the other three networks are tabulated in Table V.
Version 3: In this section, we analyzed the Noordin Mo-
hammed Top network, shown in Fig. 5(a). The MDCS for
this network is V ′2 = {7, 14, 18}, which implies that, four
red nodes (corresponding to the four key individuals in this
network) will receive a unique color if colors are injected in
V ′2 only. Even if we assume that the cost of monitoring a key
individual in a network is same as the cost of monitoring a low
level individual (which most likely is false), monitoring three
nodes (7, 14, 18) results in a 33.33% reduction in resource
requirements, as compared to monitoring four red nodes.
B. I-to-O Networks
In this subsection, we analyzed the I-to-O network from
East Turkestan, studied in [9], and shown in Fig. 5(b). In
this figure, the yellow squares (nodes) represent the terror-
ist organizations and the blue circles (nodes) represent the
members of these organizations. It may be noted that this
is a bipartite graph with a bi-partition formed by the blue
and yellow nodes. This bipartite graph is not “twin-free”,
as several pairs of nodes such as G29 and G18 as well as
G35 and G37 are “twins”. In order to compute Discriminating
Code Set of this bipartite graph, we first transformed it into
a “twin-free” graph by combining several nodes into super-
nodes. After the transformation, we have a bipartite graph
with 20 yellow nodes (out of a total of 27, in the original
graph). The MDCS for this transformed graph is V ′2 =
{P94, P52, P85, P93, P60, P59, P87, P81, P83, P32, P17,
P19, P21, P25, P37}. Using similar arguments as in I-to-I
network version 3, it can be claimed that our Discriminating
Code based technique results in a 25% reduction in resource
requirements (15 monitors instead of 20 corresponding to each
of the organizations).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel approach for monitoring
terrorist networks that results in a significant reduction in
resource requirements on the part of the law enforcement au-
thorities. We considered four different scenarios and provided
solution techniques for all of them. Moreover, we conducted
extensive experimentation on six real world networks and
demonstrated significant reduction in resource requirements.
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